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Introduction

When I began writing this piece I thought it would focus specifically on the implications
of curated algorithms. I wondered how a curated algorithm could shape a worldview, contribute
to political and cultural polarization, and prevent people with different curated algorithms
manifest on their personalized computer technologies from being able to communicate. As I
wrote, though, I came to realize that I had to develop a notion of what a worldview is, what it
consists of, how we come to construct a worldview, how we communicate and reshape our
beliefs, and what underlies the construction of those beliefs. With these inquiries my project
dramatically changed form — as it ought to happen. My project is about first coming to grips
with persuasion and its use. I do this in order to investigate how technologies of today impact
persuasion and its diminishment, a phenomenon I have taken note of in my day to day. My work
leads to an attempt to carry the many threads that develop to the end, and the primary thread that
unites the work is a consideration of the body and its relationship to language.
My attempt involves an approach to worldviews and the curation therein using a
Wittgensteinian lens. My first chapter lays the groundwork for my conception of a worldview by
orbiting the themes of persuasion, the body, belief, and the irrational, all of which are
fundamental components in my imagination of worldviews. Persuasion, I argue, is a concept that
cannot be detached from considerations of the body.
My second chapter deals with defining curation. I explore Heidegger’s “Question
Concerning Technique” as well as “A Letter on Humanism.” Both of these texts will be essential
in developing a sense of what curation means. I draw on the Heideggarian notion of enframing,
or Ge-stell. This understanding of enframing is further expounded upon with an analysis of lyrics
by Phil Elverum, which delves into the issues of the absurd.
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The third chapter deals explicitly with the actual curation of worldviews, the whole
phrase, at this point, well defined. My exploration in this regard is predominantly original and
therefore dangerous. Working with the epistemological implications of the work, I present space
for ethical questions to arise, but pose no answers. My purpose is merely to bring these questions
up, to define them, and to investigate the way in which the irrational — the absurd in life —
serves as a way of thinking about them.
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Chapter 1

Persuasion, Coercion & Body

To say what persuasion essentially is would be a fruitless affair. Persuasion in context is
what is of concern. Context, however, may lead to the blurring of persuasion on one hand and
coercion on the other, which are commonly spoken of as opposites and two words worth
seperating only to show how in ordinary language1 they are entangled. That entanglement is of
initial concern, as it represents the connection between the body and language, which is, to be
clear, a concern distinct from mind-body dualism.
Consider, as a preliminary working example, a course on conflict management, especially
as it relates to conflict in politics or in the context of office work relations. Here, there may be a
functional distinction between the terms persuasion and coercion. Jim, the Human Resources
Manager, might want to use the distinction as a way to distinguish between punishable offences
at work, i.e., coercive action (wherein one physically, or emotionally forces one to get a job
done), and acceptable practices, i.e., persuasive action (convincing a co-worker that an idea is
worthwhile and they should do it). To be clear, the distinction here has a functional purpose. It

1

By ordinary language I mean to awaken the notion of words in their everyday use. Philosophers
have long attempted to subvert the everydayness of meaning by divorcing words from their utterances,
like in a great deal of metaphysics. By considering words in their ordinary uses, the difficulty of
crystallizing a salient definition or deciphering an isolated meaning becomes clear. Accepting and
exploring that language and the meaning of words are often convoluted is itself a philosophical approach
that can assist in attempts to understand extrapolate concepts, while simultaneously recognizing the limits
of concepts more broadly. This point is elaborated further in Donald Davidson’s “On the Very Idea of a
Conceptual Scheme,” which plays an important role in my thinking throughout this paper.
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represents an ordinary (that is, ordinary insofar as it is ordinary within the language game2 posed
here) use of the words persuasion and coercion. It separates coercion from persuasion to
emphasize the inappropriate role of physical or emotional torment in a particular context: the
office. If the office example is stripped from its context and we take the working, functional
definitions as rigid absolutes, what we are left with is a deeply warped understanding of the
distinction between persuasion and coercion, as the rigidity of this distinction outside of this
language game is not so neat.
To persuade is to interact with the emotional, physical, and psychological states of
another, all of which are intertwined.
Persuasion, the attempt to impart a belief, necessarily involves the body, which is to say,
emotion, passion, mental states, the space that the body3 is in, etc.. I mean to emphasize the role
of the corporeal in persuasion. In a polemical sense, I am deliberately prioritizing gesticulation
that is concerned with persuasion as it reinforces the notion that persuasion is an embodied
practice. Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides an early account of this line of thinking. While Aristotle is
undoubtedly entrenched in Platonic essentialism, which I am by no means espousing, his work
on persuasion and the role of emotion, or pathos, in Rhetoric opens up avenues for exploring the
persuasion-coercion dichotomy. Pathos, in my language, represents the mode of persuasion
discussed in Aristotle’s Rhetoric that involves the invocation of emotion and a care for context
and audience. Using pathos as opposed to simply emotion, which will happen throughout this
2

I use language game in line with Wittgenstein in order to indicate that I am speaking about a
form of language that is limited and not representative or claiming to speak to the whole of language.
Language games are a way of exploring concepts by investigating ordinary life.
3
In my terms, body is meant to encapsulate a great deal. It by no means excludes the mind or
constructs a dualism, but instead invokes not simply emotion and that which is tied to the discourse I
frame in that sense, but it reinforces the Davidsonian notion that is implicitly prevalent throughout this
project that in thinking through concepts we are thinking in, at, from, (etc.) a perch, or a vantage point.
(Davidson, 7).
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project, indicates that more than simply appeals to emotion are happening, but instead speaks to
the complexity and depth of the role of emotion in language. In order to hop on board with my
analysis and use of Aristotle I invite the reader to drop Aristotle’s baggage which is the residue
of Platonic essentialism. Platonic essentialism attempts to say what something is and presumes
that this naming aligns with a higher conceptual order, an order that asserts itself as severed from
ordinary life.
While in many regards Aristotle’s focus on everydayness is a way out of this, the
background of essentialism lends itself to a kind of realism that presumes that the everyday,
while maybe not connected to a higher order, still is what it is. Realism, in this sense, is born out
of a Platonic essentialism that informs Aristotle’s work, but by no means casts it into the realm
of the archaic. Indeed, much of Aristotle’s work does not rely on this kind of realism, it simply
espouses it in its given historical context. It is in this way that we can usefully bring Aristotle
into conversation with Wittgenstein in an attempt to elaborate a theory of persuasion.
The body, for Aristotle, has an important role, in a preliminary and rough sense, in the
language one uses and the way one interprets language. Role, in this sense, means a part, insofar
as the body is a part of language, the body grounds language in its everydayness, the kind of
everydayness of language that metaphysics often attempts to transcend via the abstract. On a
very basic note, the same comment will strike me differently when I am happy than when I am
sad (same so far as it is the same on the set of criteria like phrasing, inflection, body language,
etc. on the part of speaker). Indeed, Aristotle explicitly argues that “our judgements when we are
pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile” (Aristotle, 168), which
may strike the reader as intuitive, but this claim is a seed laid for the argument against
essentialism. This is grounds for an argument against essentialism insofar as it gives thought to
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the realization that perception is — in a rough sense — a projection. I mean projection in the
sense that one’s sense data is carved up based on their personal experiences.4 How I view the
world, how I, in a given moment, interpret or intend to carve out what is depends not on the thing
itself necessarily, but my role, my state, in defining, in constructing a cohesive image (literally
and figuratively) of that thing. The reason Aristotle does not see it that way has a great deal to do
with the fact that this statement is framed in the context of pathos.
Pathos, in Aristotle’s terms is a discourse devoid of truth-value of the higher platonic
order. Regardless of the philosophical and more specifically epistemological value we give to the
pathos discourse, it stands fast that our judgements are subject to our state of being in a given
moment. Again, for Aristotle, judgement is distinct from truth. To be persuaded by an idea raised
by a speaker and believing in it — even if it is not true in the highest order in a Platonic sense —
does not have epistemological implications for Aristotle, only rhetorical implications.
Fundamental here though, is the entanglement of judgement and the body, and specifically, pain.
Here, the body, in a physical sense, is playing into Aristotle’s consideration of persuasion. The
line between persuasion and coercion is made fuzzy again.
To be persuaded is to make judgements, to make decisions, which are contingent upon
one’s habitus, a condition of the body that is itself contingent on the context that body inhabits.
These decisions, these judgements, come to form the foundation of our beliefs. This is part of the
nebulous web of words and one’s associations with their own vocabulary (with other words, with

4

To elaborate this point further, for the skeptic, consider a motorcycle mechanic. When I look at
a motorcycle, I see a mess of metal that I cannot possibly understand, and I see it in large clumps. When
my father, a mechanic, looks at that same machine, he sees a world of complexity, an abundance of parts I
cannot even begin to imagine, as I have not engaged the materials. It is in this sense that perception is a
projection. We see the same object differently as a result of our prior personal experience with the object
at hand. My purpose here is to consider how one’s emotional state, their bodily disposition, can further
complicate this relationship.
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experiences, emotions, etc.), which we come to use to order the world. This is a practice, like
riding a skateboard. In the same way that one comes to deepen their skateboarding abilities and
begins seeing staircase railings as grind rails, one who comes to deepen their belief in a god
might start seeing that god in the fog on their windshield. Here, I am beginning to literalize a
metaphor. Worldview, or Weltanschauung in German, comes down to the ground. A worldview
is not only a metaphor for the notion that our language, the words we use, the things we carve
out and individuate, impacts how we carve out meaning regarding the world, but worldview is
literalized insofar as language has a profound impact on how we see things in the world, how we
literally perceive the world around us.

“Moving” Beyond Reason

Zeke’s roommate is amiable, handsome, etc.. His roommate panders in the halo effect.
His roommate also despises when dishes are left in the sink. No amount of reason has ever led
Zeke to believe that dishes are worth doing immediately after they eat. Comfortable digestion
will permanently outweigh any suggestion otherwise. For Zeke, there is no sensation better than
sitting on the couch and lazing away with some warm tea. When his roommate really wants the
dishes done, and he knows Zeke has just eaten and is digesting, he persuades Zeke with appeals
to emotion, which is to say the tone of his voice, his facial expressions, his visible annoyance,
etc.. There is a clear physicality to this act of imparting the belief that the dishes are worth doing
immediately. But is it not odd to call this imparting a belief? In the end, Zeke puts down his tea
and exclaims “alright! You have persuaded me. I will do it.” But wasn’t he forced to do it? Did
he have another option?
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If we continue with a false sense of rigidity regarding the definition of persuasion — one
that takes persuasion as distinct from coercion insofar as that distinction would suggest that the
body, force, threats, etc. are not’ involved in the encounter — Zeke’s comment would be
nonsense, as it is clear that a great deal influences the interaction beyond the actions in the
circumstance itself. The setting is not the office. Does it matter what we name the cause? Does it
not only matter that we can name the conditions and that we move from there? What matters
here is that so-called persuasion, with all of the ambiguities that lie therein when one attempts to
transcend context in their discussion of the word, still seems to come into use when dealing with
that which is beyond reason. If persuasion is the mode through which we impart belief, than the
implications are of significant interest. Even if persuasion is the mode through which we impart
something other than belief and it entails new behaviors and interactions with the world, its
implications are still deeply important for us to consider. This case, as opposed to the office,
shows that persuasion involves the kinds of things in language and in the body that cannot be
easily transcribed unless we can name what resists naming, what moves away from naming —
note the irrational, the absurd.
Wittgenstein argues that “at the end of reasons comes persuasion,” (OC, S. 612) but I do
not take this to mean that persuasion does not involve reason. Note that the quote is about
“reasons,” not reason. What Wittgenstein is getting at is the relationship between bodies in
attempts to impart belief — or stated differently and more broadly (and more problematically) —
to alter one’s view of the world. The relationship between bodies involves going beyond reason
exactly because the body, in my terms, represents the irrational, the emotional, and yet it serves
as the vessel through which we communicate, it is a part of communication in a fundamental
way. Aristotle’s exploration of pathos is concerned with the appeals to emotion we make amidst
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persuasive speech acts. Wittgenstein is exploring the exact same question in distinct terms, but
the role of the body cannot be understated, as it is home to the sensory apparati that form the
foundation for pathos, for emotional appeals, for the irrational. Wittgenstein’s point is that we
can be made to believe something by that which goes beyond reason, beyond logos5 in the
Aristotelian sense. Indeed, Aristotle would take no issue with this, he views pathos as
fundamental in the context of persuasion. Pathos is beyond reason insofar as we do not, at least
typically, reason our emotions (though, in the context of something like theater, this claim
obviously breaks down). The difference for Wittgenstein however is that persuasion is part of
how we construct meaning and systems of knowledge — how we come to see the world, which
allows us to begin speaking about worldviews in a way that is useful.
Indeed, if “language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination" (OC, S. 475), then
how could we ever subject it to the supposed rigor of rationality and expect this approach to lead
to Truth? How might we provide a logic for language if language itself did not develop logically,
with consistency? It seems that pain, the emotional, that which Aristotle and Wittgenstein both
explore as places of blurring in language, all involved in an exploration of the body and its role
in language, are the best place to evidence the claim that language is not born out of a rational
ordering that belongs to some higher order. If one’s pain can be said to affect their judgements,
then how might we transcribe this pain? How might we transcribe the body? What does it mean
when one is sad? How much can be grasped that is intended? That language did not emerge out
of a kind of ratiocination is evidenced by persuasion — the attempt to impart belief — being
beyond reason. The office has every reason to draw a line that seems subject to a kind of logos,

5

In Greek, logos connotes a contrast with pathos insofar as it indicates that which involves logic,
as opposed to that which is subject to emotion. For the purposes of this project, this brief description is
adequate.
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but Zeke, it seems, does not, as Zeke’s case is mired in pathos. Despite the difficulty in
transcribing the body, it plays a fundamental role in what we come to believe and what we come
to see in the world. This is no mere irony, nor a truism, but a nod to the irrational and an
acceptance of the uncertainty we must encounter in philosophy if we give due diligence to the
everyday and to the body. Even if we could rationalize an emotional expression, if we could
name the neural pathways and the sensory modalities that were involved in the event, as modern
science attempts to do, how much would we learn about the experience itself? This question
might not be philosophical in its nature and it is certainly beyond the scope of this attempt, but it
is worth a wink, as philosophy is best served by opening more doors than it closes.

Interpretation Beyond Reason

Now, I will frame persuasion again, with the intention of deliberately blurring: the act of
coercing another into believing an idea. In a rough sense, persuasion is contingent upon two
basic criteria (to be fair, this could be said of many phrases): (1) the existence of a community of
speakers and (2) a space for speakers to enter discourse.
One might be tempted to say that, in light of 1, without a common language one could
simply not persuade another person into a desired end, but only physically coerce them, like
trying to catch a mouse in a trap. You could not very well tell a mouse, “come here and stand on
this trap.” In this context, coercion, as an approach to moving from a means to an ends, involves
force or threats necessarily, as opposed to reasoning. This would suggest, then, that two humans
without a common language are like a mouse and a human, but who is the mouse? Clearly,
neither. To be the mouse, so to speak, would be to have a language that is untranslatable, in a
sense this would add up to having a private language, a notion which, for now, we will defer to
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Wittgenstein’s complex dismissal of. Individuals can express themselves with6 their body and
interpret the moves of others, consider gesticulation and the whole lot; however, even the
language games of the body may be different, the whole lot might include that which cannot be
easily interpreted, or interpreted at all. To interpret a gesticulation as pained, one must believe
that the other is in pain. How might we substantiate that belief? What circumstance would even
require that one names the reasons for this belief? This mode of belief, the belief that someone is
in pain, is odd exactly because to doubt that someone was in pain would require a special
circumstance. For instance, at the theatre. And yet, our conception of a worldview must
incorporate this kind of belief, belief that is involved with that which moves beyond reason,
because — while it may not be neat and convenient for the sake of argument — belief of this
kind can be sensibly spoken of despite its evasion of doubt.
A particular intention behind a gesticulation may be entirely misinterpreted by another
viewer with a distinct language, operating in their own language game. To be a speaker is to
have a language, which is to interpret and intend, to persuade, and to be persuaded, and even to
assume and to doubt. This does not necessarily require the same language as another, but any
language at all — a capacity to think. And yet, force and threats, when they cannot be spoken
can only be acted out by a body, by the physical. While this dichotomy is useful for the sake of
the argument, the reader ought to pause and question the notion that what is spoken is somehow
not itself a form of physical violence. Do we not hear through our ears, are our ears not physical
apparti responsible for the processing of particular sense data?
One might, for instance, use peanut butter to increase the chance of catching the mouse in
the trap. Is it not odd though, that it makes sense here to speak of coercing a mouse into a trap,
6

The use of “with,” as opposed to “through” or something of the sort helps avoid a claim I am
not trying to make. I am not trying to construct a distinction between the body and language, but rather
explore them by investigating the blurred connections.
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through the use of force or threat via physical objects, but it would be nonsense to speak of
persuading the mouse to enter the trap, unless it was here spoken about metaphorically, or if our
understanding of persuasion were flexible enough to allow for physical coercion to be a part of
the criteria. If that were the case, what language game would one be operating in? Well, it seems
that this rigidity is rarely the case. I wonder how often a friend has ever been called out on
nonsense for claiming they could persuade a mouse into a trap.
What might the realization that bringing any notion of persuasion into the mouse context
tell us about a theory of persuasion more broadly? Anything at all? Does this insinuate that
persuasion is contingent upon a common language and that coercion is not?
Consider the case of Cyrl leading a clearly parched traveller, a traveller who does not
speak Cyrl’s language, to a pond with potable water. The traveller, lets say, was immensely
hesitant to drink the water from the pond and of course one could not introspect their mental
state and unveil why.. It is plausible that they the traveller was uncertain if the water would get
them sick, but it is just as plausible that the traveller believes water is boring and the traveller
would rather perish than drink it. Without a common language, how might we contradict this
claim? Let us also add — to ground the example before we derail it — that this traveller knows
empirically, based on a map, that very soon they will be at a campsite where they have a water
purification device and hence the traveller is not acting out of necessity if they do drink from the
pond. In response to this possibility, let us say Cyrl cups the water in their hands and sips it, and
wave the other person over, all with a smile. The parched traveller crouches down and drinks. It
seems, then, they were persuaded that the water is safe. The idea was that the water was safe to
drink, the goal was to get the traveller to believe said idea, and the goal was achieved. Though,
this was clearly not coercion, as no force or threat was used. Clearly, persuasion has a great deal
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to do with the body, with physical objects. If we assume that language is limited to letters and
speech acts, there was no language game unfolding. Though, we can still maintain (1) as a
quality, insofar as the traveller is a speaker, with their own community, and despite not sharing
the same language, a language, any language, was fundamental in the exchange. Even without a
common language, one can persuade and persuaded, so long as they can be moved — moved to
think, moved to feel.

Judgement & Body

To pretend that one is persuaded without coercion requires that one separate rational
speech on one hand and the body (emotion, neurochemical reactions, pains, etc.). The body is a
central component in persuasion, whether in speech or when reading a text, all of the factors
mentioned are at play.
While Aristotle saw philosophy as a discipline entangled with forms, with facts, amidst
the pursuit of knowledge, he says that “the arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar
emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man
who is judging the case” (Rhetoric, 76), and he is speaking of this circumstance in the context of
persuasive speech. Pathos comes to be a fundamental part of meaning-making, of framing a
worldview. The danger can be said to be that emotion, pathos, can be employed to distract from
truth claims, to lead us away from essential forms, and henceforth, knowledge. This danger,
though, is only dangerous to essentialism. It only clears the way for a deeper understanding of
how we come to see the world and how that view may come to be curated. Indeed, with all of
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this in mind, we can begin to bridge the gap between Aristotle and Wittgenstein, and see their
philosophies as compatible, allowing that the essentialist baggage7 is dropped.
Close attention to pathos is what leads to effective persuasion in a practical sense. The
tone of voice when a speaker utters a word, the way the listener feels when they encounter those
words, the space they are standing in, the memories the speaker and listener may have fostered in
that space, etc. all have an impact on the meaning they derive from the speech act. We must not
be concerned merely with the speech act itself, but also with what lies around it. This view, in
the context of knowledge, is incompatible with Aristotle’s understanding of Platonic forms and
cannot make sense within his framework, insofar as essential forms become subject to context
and subjectivity; however, in the context of persuasion, of judgements, it is fundamental for
Aristotle. In the context of unearthing truths, arriving at knowledge, the body is a useless
consideration for Aristotle. But when, with Wittgenstein, we begin to see knowledge as “related
to a decision (Entscheidung)” (OC, 47, S. 362), a decision necessarily mired in idiosyncrasies,
and we understand decisions as requiring judgement to come to those decisions, decisions that
involve the body, we begin to see that a consideration of pathos in the context of knowledge is
entirely pertinent.
Indeed, Wittgenstein flips the idea of forms on its head in a transfiguration of the word
‘form.’ In order for propositions to be liable to doubt, he argues, there must be things we do not
doubt. We are apt at cutting down trees, and any doubt about the existence of a tree would be an
absurdity, besides in the context of a philosopher’s dilemma, or something in that vein. But,
through his questioning of whether or not the tree exists, Wittgenstein arrives at what he names
“comfortable certainty,” which can be chocked up to the kinds of things, like the existence of a
7

chapter.

Keep in mind the description of Aristotle’s flavor of essentialism described earlier in this
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tree, that we can know and would be impossible if it were otherwise in an ordinary context and if
that impossibility was challenged it would lead to complete and utter bewilderment. He calls this
“comfortable certainty” a “form of life” (OC, 46, S. 356). Here the word ‘form’ comes to
represent a deep-seated subjectivity. Rather than forms suggesting a kind of essentialism,
Wittgenstein uses the word to get at the contingency of our comfort with certain propositions.
Forms of life come to represent the messy idiosyncratic associations that one has with the words
that they employ in particular language games that form a nebulous web of meaning that informs
the way they see the world. If our certainty is subject to the conditions of particular context, than
a truth necessarily becomes a foundation for only that context — it does not extend beyond the
particularities of the language-game.
I am not arguing that truth is merely relative. Rather, truth can be spoken of in objective
terms, within a particular language game; however, we must be careful in our imagination of the
limits and extent of the meaningfulness of terms like truth beyond their context. This is distinct
from the charges of relativism insofar as it does not at all reject the notion that objective speech
is not only plausible, but constantly used. The limits of my vantage point are the limits of my
capacity for objectivity, but that by no means rules out the notion of objectivity that relativism
attempts to do away with. Donald Davidson describes this saliently when he argues first “that the
truth of a sentence is relative to (among other things) the language to which it belongs”
(Davidson, 11) and later that the “truth of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as
objective as can be” (Davidson, 20).
Aristotle’s understanding regarding persuasion and his emphasis of the role of pathos
within that context has a great deal of overlap with Wittgenstein’s understanding of the body in
the context of certainty. Wittgenstein argues that “it is not that on some points men know the
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truth with perfect certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude” (OC, 52, S.
404). A missionary attempting to convert another is not relying on certainty, but faith, and their
certainty is not a factual certainty, but is rather made manifest in their disposition, in their tone,
in their body language, their attitude. This disposition, the embodiment of certainty, is
instrumental in constructing a worldview.
The coupling of the notion of forms of life with the idea that comfortable certainty is
often an attitude rather than a thought come to be at the foundation of a theory of language
games. The taking away or taking on (nehmen an or annehmen) forms of life and certain
attitudes in particular contexts means having assumptions, explicit or implicit, about certain
things which cannot be doubted. Indeed, nehmen an and annehmen, both are translated as
“assumption” in the English translation of On Certainty, but they reflect taking away or taking
on respectively. In this sense, an assumption is dynamic. It is dynamic insofar as it involves both
intending an interpreting, which come to be at the basis of how we construct beliefs, act on
certainties, and frame a worldview. We do this when we throw words out there and see what
lands, what moves work within a language game, and by seeing what fails.
The realist might argue that we are a passive receptor of what is out there. This view does
not object to the notion that there are things out there (things in a much more limited sense
insofar as those things, as material itself is something to be carved out by a perceiver), but takes
issue, in a more limited sense, with the notion that what is perceived is not subject to the
idiosyncrasies that are involved in crafting a perception. Our faculties are subject to our selves.
Indeed, in our engagement with language, we take on what works. What one sees as working
comes to be a part of how they see the world, how one approaches problems. In the same sense,
we do this by listening to others, by taking away their moves, the phrases that have use in a
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language game. Assumptions allow for moves to be made without every move being subject to
doubt. The assumption “forms the basis of action… of thought” (OC, 52, S. 411). We assume
that the sensation of pain means that one is in pain, and this clears the possibility that we may be
moved to do something about it.
It is these assumptions, assumptions about certain things that we do not even name in
ordinary language, like the existence of a tree, that “belong to the foundation of a language
game… the entire system of our language-games” (OC, 52, S. 411). But these assumptions can
come into conflict. For instance, the assumption that there is, or is not a god, or that there are
many gods. How can a missionary convert a native who assumes there are many gods, not just
one. Certainly reason does not go far enough. Any reasons contrary to the notion that there are
many gods is built into the notion itself, it accounts for attempts to evidence otherwise. Religions
have been built on their ability to persuade others, to transcend reason and to create new
language games, new foundations, all while harnessing the attitude of certainty. Now, we can
find a parallel in contemporary life with political parties. Certainty regarding an agenda is not
only embodied though, but employed across new technological mediums. That these active
techniques, manifest in technologies, involve in a certain sense a lack of embodiment of the
attitude of certainty. The body becomes loosely tethered to the attitude as it becomes acted on
through technologies that evade the hands. This claim will be given much more labor in the next
chapter, but it is important to begin introducing it here, in somewhat vague terms, to pre-empt a
more thorough investigation.
What changes these assumptions about whether there is one god or many gods is not
reason, but persuasion. While Descartes and others were debating the existence of God, framing
the question, and constructing arguments, missionaries were out in the field persuading people of
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their beliefs. The employment of persuasion, which relies on a range of assumptions, requires a
series of decisions and judgements, has long been a means through which humans come to get
each other on board with a particular or general worldviews. The idiosyncrasies of a worldview
seem to have a great deal to do with the range of ideas one has encountered — that one has
encountered persuasively, that is.

Belief & Body

An attempt to impart a belief, to instill a conviction is a deeply muddled process, one not
defined simply by reason. If there is a man who believes that the world came into being fifty
years ago — one who grew up in a circumstance so special such that the reasons for doubting
this are already considered in the worldview which is his lens — reasons are not enough. If one
simply provides reasons, nothing more, in an attempt to dissuade this man from his belief, it will
do nothing, so long as reason is all that is at play. All those reasons are already a consideration in
his worldview and therefore any other reasons are disregardable. But how can only reason be at
play? What does it mean to say that? In its longer form, Wittgenstein says, “I said I would
'combat’ the other man,—but would I not give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go?
At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert
natives.)” (OC, S. 612). Persuasion is being contrasted with mere argument, with justifications
that do not account for things like emotion, or the body, or, as Aristotle conceives of it, pathos.
To engage pathos, to look towards context, to examine language games as language
games is to subvert the polemical paradigm, to lead language back to the self, and to foster a
sense of self that is opposed to other individuals, such that the polemical suddenly turns back in,
self-annihilating, and clears space for the body to enter. If thinking was manifest in a standing
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out, in the Heideggerian sense, or a leading back, in the Wittgensteinian sense, or a turning
around, in the Emersonian sense, we would not be able to think without a spine to rise with, legs
to be led, or hips to turn. Just as thinking, in all of these metaphors, calls on a kind of motion, an
action even, we think because we are moved to think, just as we are moved to tears. The body,
emotion, what Aristotle sums up with the term pathos, defines a mode of persuasion that, at its
core, uses the body, the irrational, as a means of imparting belief, of getting one to move from
uncertainty to certainty while subverting the strictly rational. Indeed, the etymological
connection between emotion and moving are at the source of my analogy. Further, though, I’m
tempted to ask, why do we think? To call thinking an inert seems, on one hand, to mean very
little, to be nearly vacuous. By equation, it would seem the same could be said of calling thinking
a moving affair. Although, it seems to me that thinking requires a motivation, to think beyond
necessity involves a kind of going beyond the immediate, this involves emotion, this involves a
kind of moving. To be struck by a thought is not only to be thinking, but to be embodied, to be
emotional, to be capable of moving or being moved in this sense.
In January, during an ice storm, I read Camus’s “On Suicide.” Upon reading the final
sentence, my tear ducts emitted a liquid. I laid in a hammock for an hour, in the cold, on the back
porch. I read the same essay again, a year and a half later. It was summer, I was on the beach. I
wondered why I read it again. Clearly, the argument never changed. I had. And sure this suggests
perception as a projection, but only in the former circumstance was I persuaded. To be persuaded
is to be in such a way that the contingencies of a given moment open you up to even considering
a series of propositions. “Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I
make count as determinants for that proposition” (OC, 2) claims Wittgenstein, bluntly. Well,
does confidence of the speaker and/or a writer count as a determinant? If this was a determinant,
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certainly our certainty is founded upon shaky foundations. But that foundation is a principle, and
are not all principles based on judgements about those principles being justifiable principles? So
are not all judgements then premised on principles that are themselves judgements?
If someone believes the earth is only fifty years old, and all evidence contrary to that
claim fits neatly into their worldview, as it has already been anticipated and reasoned away, how
might they come to change their mind? Certainly reason would fall short. If an argument is
persuasive enough, maybe their belief will be altered. But once again, we encounter the issue of
persuasion. Here, we must again recall the pathos in which Aristotle frames his conception of
persuasion in Rhetoric. The time of year, the unique circumstances surrounding my current lot,
the very room I am in, will all have an impact on my perception and interpretation of certain
propositions. Just as the one proposing something will have the nature of their proposal altered
by the same ephemeral and innumerable possibilities at play when they utter their proposition.
All of these factors involve the body and its faculties. So we see that circumstance and belief are
entangled. This is only to echo the notion that the body and belief are entangled, and very word
body involves its habitus, what lies around it.

Contingency & Body

The totality of one’s certainties, of one’s beliefs, constitute a kind of worldview, or at
least part of the notion of a worldview. Richard Rorty argues that one has a final vocabulary
which they employ in communication — a final vocabulary is never final insofar as it is
unchanging, but something that constantly moves, transforms, and alters. It is final only insofar
as words are doing things and the words in play are, well, the words. A final vocabulary
represents a nebulous web of not only the phrases in use, but the language game at play, the
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associations with particular words built on idiosyncratic experiences, etc.. This totality (roughly)
of one’s vocabulary is made up of beliefs, convictions, feelings, etc. and it is not exactly static or
additive, but flexible and viable to change dramatically from one moment to the next, from one
mood swing or memory to another. The philosophy of language cannot merely be concerned
with vocabularies, but with what “lies around it” (OC, 21, S. 144) as Wittgenstein frames it.
What lies around it, in a simple sense, is a comment on the importance of what makes a belief
hold fast, which is the context in which the belief is brought into being. The belief that is held
fast, as opposed to the belief that is liable to shift, is said to be held fast by the system that lies
around it, the system of knowledge, the system of “what is believed” holds in place a particular
belief. If a particular belief does not fit into the system, it is liable to be shifted. But what causes
the potential for a shift? What opens one up to the possibility that a particular belief is not held
fast, that it is not entirely compatible with the system that lies around it?
Rorty argues that in order to see how one can be opened up to the possibility that a belief
is incompatible with a worldview, with their system of beliefs, we must limit our examination of
“the opposition between rational and irrational forms of persuasion to the interior of a language
game” (CIS, 47-48). This is to say that to construct a division that puts reason (or rational
conviction, in Rorty’s terms) on one side and emotion (or passion, in Rorty’s terms) is not useful
on its own, unless it is qualified as being a persuasive speech act. Further, he tempers the
distinction by making clear that we ought to understand the terms reason and emotion as reason
being akin to rational conviction, and emotion as being the sort of thing that arises due to causes,
as opposed to reasons. The claim that reasons can be a cause for emotion is entirely justified, at
this juncture, but Rorty means something very particular by causes.
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For Rorty, causes are specifically, simply put, “not reasons.” (CIS, 47-48) Though,
causes cannot be usefully spoken of outside of the limitations of a language game. In order to
delineate this distinction, Rorty notes the obvious differences between what is conveyed in a
Socratic dialogue as opposed to the diminished role of reason and the employment of cause in
hypnotic suggestion. While there is a kind of intuitive inclination to accept the distinction, it only
scratches the surface of the distinction, and Rorty does not deny this. Indeed, to accept the
distinction so simply would be self-defeating, as it has no proper place within the confines of a
contextualized language game. Rorty, though, is less concerned with truth values than he is with
the use value of such a distinction: “within a language game, within a set of agreements about
what is possible and important, we can usefully distinguish reasons for belief from causes for
belief which are not reasons” (CIS, 47-48). Causes for belief which are not reasons falls into the
rough category of persuasion. Rorty argues that since there is “no neat way to draw the line
between persuasion and force” there is “therefore no neat way to draw a line between a cause of
a changed belief which was also a reason and one which was a ‘mere’ cause” (CIS, 48).
Nonetheless, what is made salient through this analysis is that within the interior of a language
game, we can begin to parse out rough sketches of these distinctions, such that we can begin to
imagine what the curation of these facets of language might mean.

Pain

In order to further clarify the close of the last section, I will lay out a consideration of
pain and curation. This will begin to clear space for a discussion about curation in the context of
persuasion, which the next chapter will focus on. Rorty thinks it is not only possible, but
meaningful, to ‘“separate the question "Do you believe and desire what we believe and desire?"
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from the question "Are you suffering?"’ (CIS, 198). The implications of such a distinguishment
cannot be understated, for Rorty. This is fundamental in creating human solidarity, which is the
central concern of his book. While a great deal of his philosophy reinforces the ideas herein, this
is where we differ. Suffering, belief, and desire are deeply entangled. Indeed, they cannot be
separated. To disentangle them would be to subject belief and desire to exactly the kind of
rationalization that Rorty sees himself sees as rebelling against, the Enlightenment sort. Rorty
recognizes this problem, but tries to portray it as purely problematic when it transcends the limits
of a language game, but he understands the separation to be useful, only somewhat problematic,
when one works within the limits of a language game.
It is not that any line is fuzzy, it is that speaking of a line in the first place is riddled with
metaphysical ambiguity that cannot be parsed out. Let us revisit the example of the parched
traveller. Does it make sense to speak of the sensation of dizziness, of a dry throat, of thirst itself
as a reason for wanting water? Maybe so, but it makes more sense to speak of it as a cause for a
desire, a cause that would lead one to believe that the water from a stranger is safe. So, can
bodily sensation be said to be a reason? Or is it merely a cause? How can we disentangle
sensation from reason? Do emotions, sensations, the body, its parts, its ephemeral needs and
desires play a role in our persuasion, or our resting potential to be persuaded, in what we take on
or take away, which is to say does not the body still, even within a language game, behave not as
one side of a line, metaphorically speaking in Rorty’s term, but as a part of a whole that cannot
function without its other parts? By limiting ourselves to the vocabulary of the language game in
an analysis of claims makes us vulnerable to forget, in the Wittgensteinian sense, what lies
around it. In the effort to separate the questions "Do you believe and desire what we believe and
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desire?" from the question "Are you suffering?" we must tread carefully to not forget what lies
around suffering, what lies around belief and desire.
If I was tasked with removing all of the parts of a body that are divisible from the
faculties that facilitate thinking, god forbid, such that one would continue to think, to reason,
unimpaired what could I remove? If I remove a thumb, might that change a person's thoughts?
And if the thoughts are now different, while they can still think, what they think about will be
different, and I have now changed the way that the faculties perceive and hence think about the
world. If a book must now be picked up differently, is the book, as an object the thinker carves
out in the world, now different? Does the person believe the book to be one way, and after losing
a thumb, now believe it to be different? They certainly would have to approach the object
differently, that is. Let us say that the difficulty of raising the book and reading the book has now
become such a task, that the person no longer reads books. The sight of a book is now a trauma,
it triggers a memory of what once was. Does that count as an impairment? How might I even
begin to parse causes for belief and reasons for belief in this context? Does it make sense to even
speak of belief here? Well, what if they believe that books are a source of pleasure, but since
they cannot engage them, they believe they are a sore sight. But a person would not believe this,
they would feel it. But how do you name this feeling, how might we even begin to parse this out,
even within the language game itself these phrases do not split apart? So when Rorty speaks of
separating the questions "Do you believe and desire what we believe and desire?" from the
question "Are you suffering?" we have to wonder if we can limit belief, desire, and suffering to a
single language game, when it seems they come to be at the foundation of many language games.
Now, this process, the process that leads to the blurring of these separate questions, is the kind of
thing that happens in an attempt to curate a reality.
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Chapter 2

Curation

This chapter will give a broad overview of curation, a term I mean to intertwine with and
build out8 of Heidegger’s Ge-stell — for now, this can be roughly translated as enframing.
Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technique” deals broadly with the impact of technology
on life and language.9 In order to elaborate my understanding of curation, to prepare for a fullfledged exploration of the idea of the curation of worldviews, it will be necessary to explicate the
complexities of Heidegger’s essay, as it is the starting place for my thinking about curation.
Indeed, curation, in the highly particularized sense in which I will employ it, will rightly be
interpreted as akin to Ge-stell. I will not be writing about Heidegger’s essay in a chronological
way, but will tackle fundamental phrases, one by one, which will be sub-headings, as a way of
giving a broad preface to the relation between Ge-stell and curation. To temper the investigation
of the themes in “A Question Concerning Technique” I will use Heidegger’s “Letter Concerning
Humanism” and selections from Being and Time to illuminate key terms and ideas that would
otherwise be nonsensical in “The Question Concerning Technique.”
For our purposes, Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technique” can be roughly broken
into two parts. The first half of the essay is concerned with an account of the way in which the
world is brought forth to man, by man. The second half of the essay is an attempt to nuance that
8

I use the word ‘build’ as a first move to unpack the role of the hands in Heidegger’s argument
regarding technique. For Heidegger, Ge-stell, or enframing, is built out of the employment of techniques
in our creation of the word in a sense that is both physical and metaphorical.
9
One could use Heidegger’s language here, but it would be of no help in the elaboration of his
ideas for the sake of the argument I put forward. Regardless, one might trade life and language for terms
like being, the destiny of mankind, objectification, homelessness, and more.
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description in light of modern technologies My purpose is to illuminate both the practical and
insidious impact that the use of technology can have on language and worldviews. I will come to
name specific technologies that highlight this, but intend to clear a space for thinking about these
issues in new ways, as the philosophical and political implications are both worth considering.

On Translation

The word technique is given in the title of Roger Berkowitz's translation of “Die Frage
nach der Technik”; however, many translators often translate the title as “The Question
Concerning Technology.” to translate Technik as technology misses the breadth with which
Heidegger employs the term, which will be revealed and elaborated throughout this chapter.
Further, translating Technik as technique allows an English reader to get a sense of the
development of the pre-Socratic, post-socratic relationship, and specifically the modern
relationship that mankind has to technique. Technique describes not only the processes through
which we construct technologies, but the way in which we approach life and language in a world
with technology. In addition, technique speaks to the relationship between art and technology (in
the sense of poetics and hands-on crafting).
I argue that while Heidegger creates a dichotomy between technique and modern
technique — a distinction I will explore throughout this chapter — it doesn’t account for a new
form of technique. I make the dichotomy into a tripartite distinction by introducing the idea of
post-modern technique.10 In a preliminary sense, post-modern technique is a byproduct of new

10

Post-modern in my terms has nothing to do with postmodernism and the ideas therein, though
one is welcome to explore any potential connections and report back to me.
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technologies that separate the body from technique. I introduce this distinction here as it is subtle
and is helpful to understand before delving into the arguments herein.
.
τέχνη

τέχνη is typically translated as craftsmanship, or craft, or art. τέχνη is the Greek root of
Heidegger’s Technik. Technique, which again is from Heidegger’s Technik, harkens to τέχνη. In
Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” he argues that since Plato and Aristotle, thinking has
garnered its value by establishing itself as a kind of τέχνη, that is, as “a process of deliberation in
service to doing and making… already seen from the perspective of πρᾶξις [acting] and ποίησις
[creating]” (LOH, 240). Heidegger’s argument presents a negatively connotated interpretation on
this “technical interpretation of thinking,” arguing that “such a characterization is a reactive
attempt to rescue thinking and preserve its autonomy over against acting and doing… such an
effort is the abandonment of the essence of thinking” (LOH, 240). It is in this way that thinking,
for Heidegger, “slips out of its element” (LOH, 241).
Heidegger’s argument in “The Question Concerning Technique” sheds more light on the
word τέχνη. Heidegger argues that “τέχνη is not only the name for handworkly doing and skill,
but also for high art and the fine arts. τέχνη belongs to bringing-forth, to ποίησις (poiesis); it is
something poetic” (QCT, 9). τέχνη belongs to the process of bringing-forth certain realizations
that may have otherwise remained hidden. Heidegger is arguing that the technique one employs
in the construction of technology is rooted in artistic creation, but that artistic creation itself has
been hijacked by public domination, the realm of the masses, of herd mentality. His concern is
explicitly with the way in which the hands-on nature of technique is changing. My concern,
which I will work towards elaborating, is with the way that technique is less tethered, and
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potentially untethered from the hands — the body — altogether. What happens when our
vantage point, in the Davidsonian sense, is obscured from technique?
Heidegger writes that “τέχνη unconceals what does not bring itself forth by itself and
does not yet lie present, what therefore can look sometimes this way, sometimes another, and can
drop-out. He who builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial cup, unconceals what is to be
brought-forth” (QCT, 9). τέχνη, for Heidegger, is a mode of unconcealing, of bringing what is
hidden from plain sight forward. Yet we must ask, for whom is this unconcealing happening to?
It is the shipbuilder for whom something is unconcealed as she builds the ship. It is the creator,
the poet, etc. who experiences or witnesses the unconcealing of their craft as it happens.
Unconcealing of what? Of technique, of the world and its way, a way of working of happening, a
way of viewing the world — worldview.11 In this sense, τέχνη is a form of rendering privacy12
manifest. Heidegger’s argument is that τέχνη is a mode “of rendering beings manifest” (LOH,
259), but since this manifestation is only immediately available to the one involved in the τέχνη,
we struggle to locate τέχνη in the context of public and private. Everyone can see the shipbuilder
building, but only she can see what is unconcealed amidst her creating — the blur. The
shipbuilder sees the ship unlike anyone else. Is this an obvious remark? It seems vital in the
effort to ride against realism as I work towards my own conclusions.
Moreover, Heidegger casts aspersions on τέχνη as it relates to thinking. As a technical
process τέχνη is active, it connotes a doing. Yet, Heidegger argues that “the essence of thinking”
11

To be clear, Heidegger does not use the language of worldviews — this is my peppering.
Privacy here is limited insofar as the creator unconceals something new amidst their creating.
What the nature of that which is unconcealed is, is not the topic of this paper. For what it is, for
Heidegger, has a great deal to do with diminishing its thingness, abstracting from the senses, imaging that
which may or may not be anew. As you can tell, these waters get murky and require too much German to
break down. Fortunately, we can maintain the sense that what is unconcealed has something to do with
intimate experience, with something entirely idiosyncratic, and in that sense, necessarily private. That’s
good enough for our purpose.
12
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(LOH, 240) is something solitudinous, as something involved not in acting, but in dwelling, in
private (LOH, 239). This dwelling is necessarily a private affair. Heidegger presents this as a
kind of essentialized, even divine mode of being. However, “private existence” itself has been
altered by “its subservience to the public realm” (LOH, 242). Heidegger’s argument is that since
thinking and hence language have come into the service of acting and doing (τέχνη) in a very
practical sense in the public realm, thinking and hence language “comes under the dictatorship of
the public realm, which decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected as
unintelligible” (LOH, 242). As a result, even when we go into our dwelling place, our language
can no longer foster truth. This is why, for Heidegger, it is the poet, the one who abstracts
language, makes it their own, can arrive at so-called truth. Heidegger names this state of being
alienated from “the truth of being,” this aimless stumbling that we do in light of our inability to
think about so-called “divine truths,” Heimatlosigkeit, or homelessness. (LOH, 258).
Homelessness, for Heidegger, is not a socio-political term, but refers to the alienation of man
from his “essential being” (LOH, 258). Homelessness is the alienation of man from his potential
to speak truth, to experience truth. What matters most to my argument is that Heidegger’s
connection, that thinking is a kind of dwelling with oneself that is challenged in important ways
when τέχνη’s technical nature gets tied in, is making explicit that thinking, as a dwelling,
involves oneself as a whole. Thinking requires sitting with oneself and navigating more than
simply thought, but body. Thinking includes the Aristotelian pathos. Heidegger’s snapshot of the
so-called essence of thought requires that we take seriously the body and its role in thinking.
This is where the body is not merely a tool for persuasion, where Heidegger brings the body,
brings emotion and what that word has come to mean in my usage, into the realm of meaning
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making. The body enters the meaning of words insofar as it is involved in the use of words and
the body influences the choice of wording one makes.

Technique

Heidegger clarifies between technique and the essence of technique. Technique is not
only a “means to an ends,” but a “doing of man,” which together come to be the “whole” of the
arrangements that establish technique (QCT, 2-3). Technique connotes that which we actively
do, whether artistically or otherwise, in order to “unconceal” (QCT, 9). And again, unconcealing
connotes a “bringing-forth” of that which was previously hidden from plain view. Unconcealing
is akin to ἀλήθεια, or truth (translated plainly).
Technique can be employed to merely represent (Vorstellen), to bring forth appearances,
or it can belong to τέχνη, to a kind of poetic doing. Technique as a mode of merely representing,
as Vorstellen, is akin to poiesis to a kind of poetic bringing-forth, a bringing-forth that, in its very
physical manifestation, in its hands-on bringing into being, it unconceals a truth that could not
have before been seen. That technique can be a surface level appearance oriented doing or one
that is more poetical, requires that we frame our understanding of technique around a doing,
rather than as a thing, an object, with thingness, as that which we can not only objectify but also
essentialize. As a doing, a happening, technique unfolds, there are steps. Unconcealing may
happen in a moment but it becomes manifest because of this or that. In that sense, unconcealing
(and a great deal else) necessarily, for Heidegger, is involved in causality, a causal chain.

Causality & Affect
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When a bat hits a ball, the ball is effected. It flies away. One needs no background in
physics to believe me. When one hits a ball at a championship game, the ball is effected. It flies
away. The audience is effected, they jump up and down. Is this merely effect? This is also a
description of an affect, an emotional engagement. But why does it take a championship, why
does it take stakes for people to jump up and down? There are states of being, affective states of
being. An argument might not only effect our behavior, but being persuaded might also mean a
profound affectation.
Heidegger writes that “for centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes: 1.
causa materialis, the material… 2. causa formalis, the form… 3. causa finalis, the end… 4. causa
efficiens... the effect” (QCT, 5). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to outline each, they
indicate the scientification of philosophy. The scientification of philosophy is, in part, due to the
Platonic essentialism that attempts to say “what something is” (QCT, 3), which is a scientific
pursuit insofar as it attempts to organize and objectify what, in Heidegger’s words, is not, which
is referred to as Sein in German.13 To split causality into a neat fourfold system involves the risk
of oversimplification, reductionism, and a whole host of other issues, but there is undoubtedly
use-value. This use-value though can be easily overstated, insofar as pieces of causality that are
irrational, or based on one’s idiosyncrasies in their observational apparti, can be overlooked, or
pretended to be arbitrary. To bring this back to the question of technique, if we examine
technique through the strict lens of the four causes, we are likely to miss these potentially
irrational idiosyncrasies. These bits that resist objectification are most concisely represented by
the idea of poiesis. The poetics, or the metaphorical, or the associative (insofar as our words are

13

Sein is translated to being, but it speaks to that part of beings, specifically human beings, that
cannot be objectified, that which resists naming and rationalization in every person, but that we can easily
lose sight of and instead blend into the masses.
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constituted by idiosyncratic associations, many of which are shared, but some of which force us
to dig for meaning in self and others), come to be fundamental in the unconcealing born out of
one’s technique.
Heidegger goes on to describe “the four causes” as "ways of being-responsible” and here
we must give thought to the double meaning of the phrase “being-responsible” (QCT, 5). On one
hand being-responsible is the sort of sentiment you might hear from your parents on a weekend
night, but it also speaks to the responsibility to not only oneself, but to the world, to the poetic, to
the potency of the potential for truth that may arise during one’s wonder about the world.
Importantly, the notion of being-responsible, as I begin to unpack it, comes to be deeply relevant
to the employment of modern and post-modern technologies14 and their role in enframing
worldviews.
Being-responsible as it relates to the four causes is elaborated with an example, the silver
cup. When one makes a silver cup, it is made out of the material silver, which is co-responsible
for it being, after one has formed it, a cup. Indeed, “the silver into which the outer-look as cup is
let-in, the outer-look into which the silver appears, are both in their ways co-responsible for the
sacrificial instrument” is a convoluted (though in the grand context of Heidegger it is fairly
concise) way of saying that the material of the cup and the form it is given are both coresponsible for the cup as a whole. This represents the causa materialis and the causa formalis,
which involves naming the form of something, a definition that leads to a conception of causa
finalis. From out of the end, “the thing does not cease to be” but rather “the thing begins to be

14

Modern technologies connotes not only the technologies that emerged in the post-socratic era, but also
includes the notion that thinking itself changed with these technologies and the techniques people began
employing were by no means different from philosophers, and in that sense the scientification of
philosophy begins. Post-modern technology is an extension of this phenomenon that represents the
disembodiment of technique.
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what it will be after its being-set-forth” (QCT, 6). To be named, to be objectified, is to be “lyingready-before-us” in Heidegger’s language (QCT, 6). To lie before one as an object is to have an
effect on one’s world, as something carved out, as a thing (QCT, 6). Stated differently,
Heidegger is laying out the argument for how something comes to be named, but he does so with
the intention of problematizing it. How a thing becomes a thing undoubtedly involves the
formation of it, but that carving out is contingent not only on the thing itself, but the language
that carves it up. That language, as I have argued, involves the body. Naming is a way of
ordering. What is ordered is perceived, it stands out, it is individuated.

Order & Bestand

Being-responsible means not only bringing something into appearance, whether it be a
cup or a painting, but forces us to consider what our role is in the process of carving things out in
the world, whether we use a technique in bringing them forth or we use a technique or a
technique informs what is individuated. Once we do that, it is ordinary for one to then
communicate their picture of their world, to attempt to get others to see things their way, to
persuade them of a particular view of the world. Heidegger calls this a Ver-an-lassen.
Veranlassen, without dashes, ordinarily means to cause, occasion, or to bring about. By using
dashes — as Berkowitz points out in a footnote — Heidegger means to restore the root sense of
the phrase, which means “completing a letting-in” (QCT, 7). Here we have a play with bringing
forth and letting in, two phrases that illuminate contrast. Technique brings forth insofar as it
makes appear, technique lets in insofar as accepts a carving out, a definition, and objectification.
There is a sense in which what I have described is both a passive and active affair.
Technique can be employed to individuate objects or to construct them. This parallels with the
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notion that there is a worldview I construct and one that is constructed for me. A worldview I
actively make sense of and persuade others of and a worldview that I have been persuaded by.
What comes to be an object is what comes to stand. What stands is necessarily ordered, it
is put forth in such a way that we can see it stand, this is Bestand. Bestand can be curated by or
for us. We can make things stand or we experience the way in which things are made to stand by
others. In this sense there is a way in which I actively construct a worldview and a way in which
a worldview is constructed for me by others. Things stand insofar as they appear to us, but
beyond the question of causality, what does this standing consist of? "The ordered has its own
stand. We name it Bestand” (QCT, 13). To order, to make Bestand, is the first step in curation, it
precedes Ge-stell insofar as Ge-stell relies on enframing what has been ordered. Curation in this
sense is very similar to the process of hanging art in a museum. The ordering of the art has its
own stand, creates its own story, it involves a view of the world that would be different if
ordered differently, in very plain terms. What is ordered is only so because of its ordering
(Bestellen) and is ordered out of the orderable (Bestellbar). Bestand, Bestellen, and Bestellbar
are described as having their “ground in what comes to language” (QCT, 14). It is in this sense,
for Heidegger, that what is ordered, while it has its stand, while it constitutes a kind of image, is
still subject to an individual’s perspective, yet that perspective is necessarily going to be tied into
the ordering itself. To illuminate this idea, Heidegger says that “Man can of course represent,
shape, and pursue this or that in such or such a way… man does not have at his disposal the
unconcealedness into which the actual shows itself or withdraws… The thinker only answered
what addressed itself to him” (QCT, 14). This is echoed by my previous mention of the
Davidsonian vantage point. Fundamental to understand here is that technique informs that
vantage point, alters it in both subtle and notable ways. In constructing conceptual schemes we
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cannot escape our perch, our body, and the limits of our language. And yet we are persuade and
do persuade people of all kinds of concepts, especially those that claim to transcend our place in
the world. On the whole, this highlights is the interplay between what is ordered, how it is
ordered, and how one perceives that ordering, which is inevitably tied into the ordering itself.
Technique involves an ordering, a way of putting things together, of gathering in order to
have some object, something carved out, stand on its own. Bestand speaks to the order of the
thing itself, what is intended as the thing itself amidst the technique that constructs it.
Importantly, Bestand doesn’t speak to what lies around the thing, what lies around or beneath
technique. For this, Heidegger uses Ge-stell. A term we will now dig right into.

Enframing & Ge-stell

In order to understand Ge-stell, it was vital to introduce terms like τέχνη, technique,
causality, being-responsible, unconcealing, and Bestand. Ge-stell, given its fundamental role in
the arguments to come, must be reckoned with carefully. To this end, I will provide a relatively
significant portion of text. As a form of stellen, Heidegger uses Ge-stell in line with these other
terms, which are mentioned in the quotes to follow. Heidegger’s use of words that share roots
leads to an etymological continuity that is near impossible to capture in one-to-one translation.
The continuity he employs reflects the way in which curation functions, it is a seamless part of
our lives that is difficult to identify unless we explore what underlies technologies and consider
the techniques that technologies are founded on.
While Ge-stell is ordinarily, and perhaps most appropriately, translated as enframing. In
order to maintain the etymological connections that Heidegger is carving out, I’ll stick with the
German Ge-stell, but it can be aptly, though not fully, translated as enframing. Heidegger’s
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initial definition of Ge-stell is difficult to stomach on its own and requires more work to get a
sense of, but it is a useful starting point:

Ge-stell is the gathering of this putting (Stellen) that puts (stellt), i.e. summons man to
unconceal the actual in the way of ordering (Bestellen) as Bestand. Ge-stell is the way of
unconcealing that sways in the essence of modern technique, and is itself nothing
technical. To the technical belongs by contrast all that we know as barring, pushing and
framing, and what is a piece of Bestand of what we name montage (QCT, 16).

To gather the putting that puts means to enframe insofar as in one’s gathering, in one’s
employment of a technique, one necessarily constructs a frame through which they see the world
and what is in it. This is a summoning insofar as, for example, one is creating a silver cup, we are
not only seeing silver as a thing with a use, but drinking as a practice facilitated by cup. The
technique employed for drinking changes when one stops using their hand or tongue to lap it up
and instead uses the silver cup. In this sense, the summoning sways through the essence of
modern technique insofar as with each of our creations, with each of our engagements we begin
to carve up the world anew, and it is not simply the objects carved out, but the way in which we
see the world itself that is of concern. Ge-stell, enframing, means not only framing a thing, but
framing how it is that we see all things. In a sense, in making a cup, I make my world anew in a
nebulous range of ways. What is ordered can be ordered by me, it can be a result of my own
creation, or it can be ordered for me. If I do not create the cup, but I use it, the ordered, what is
brought-forth comes to inform my worldview despite my disconnect from the construction of the
object itself.
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Heidegger goes on to explore the importance of stellen in Ge-stell especially as it relates
back to the idea of τέχνη, insofar as τέχνη is entangled with poiesis:

The word ‘stellen’ in the title Ge-stell does not mean only summoning, it is at the same
time to preserve the resonance of another ‘Stellen,’ out of which it stems namely that of
the setting-forth-and-there, in the sense of poiesis, that lets what is present come forth in
unconcealedness” (QCT, 17).

In this sense, Ge-stell speaks to the idea that with technique, with a kind of bringing-forth, a
setting-forth, in our poetic creations, we are unconcealing insofar as a creation brings something
new forth, and yet, this enframes insofar as what is unconcealed to us is unconcealed within a
frame, insofar as creation entails limitations. To enframe, to Ge-stell, is for something to be
summoned, but that summoning is part of the sway of Ge-stell through modern technique,
“which requires the orderability of nature as Bestand” (QCT, 18). The ordered is brought into a
frame through our ordering and hence summoning. What comes to hand, comes to hand with all
that lies around it, but that context is necessarily altered by the new object that is carved out
within it. Heidegger’s mention that there is a poetic element to Stellen supports the idea I posed
earlier in the section on causality. There is a sense of affectation. A sense that what is enframed,
what comes to stand within a frame, has the capacity to affect one, that is their body and their
language. That what is framed by us and for us, what constitutes our worldview, that we come to
be persuaded by or persuade others of is deeply related to the affective state, the habitus of the
body.
Heidegger notes a highly particular and relevant concern regarding the essence of
technique resting in Ge-stell. As enframing, Ge-stell makes it such that in our handlyworking we
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are distanced from poiesis, from the poetics of creation, because “technique must employ the
exact science of nature” (QCT, 19). This is to say that in order to bring something forth, we must
navigate the frames that have been provided for the utilization of our techniques. This is a deeply
hands-on oriented remark. To see an object as an object that has been brought forth by a
technique is to see an object that has been brought forth according to the science of nature that
man has and continues to try and master.

Curation & Ge-stell

To live in the modern world with modern technologies is to live amidst the frames of
technique. I use the word curation as one deeply intertwined with the idea of Ge-stell that
Heidegger presents. Modern technologies of late not only have the capacity to enframe according
to the exact science of nature, but have the capacity to enframe by generating an objectifiable
sense of one’s self. To be in the modern world is to be understood according to the Ge-stell that
sways through the technologies we engage and the techniques we employ. Post-modern
technologies — algorithms15 being an excellent example — have the capacity to enframe our
interests, our passions, and to encircle them with data points, hence turning the parts of self
previously held as subjectivity idiosyncrasies as outlined and utilized points of interpretation in
order to present a feedback loop that speaks to our imagined sense of self and our imagined sense
of the world. This is to say that those aspects of self that are so nebulous that they constitute a
kind of darkness that is only accessible as an imagination are now traceable and manipulatable,
which is to say that our worldview can be curated accordingly for practical and insidious
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Algorithms will be given a more substantial definition in the next chapter.

39

purposes. This doesn’t just constitute a set of circumstances but a way of life as a modern amidst
modern technique.

Curation & The Absurd

The curation of worldviews in the era of the modern human condition presents one with
inevitable absurdities. Phil Elverum (AKA Mount Eerie), a philosopher and artist, captures the
circumstance of the absurd in the modern human condition amidst the enframing and curation of
worldviews aptly in a two part song called “Through the Trees.”16 The song’s two parts are on
two different albums, as if to highlight the disjointedness of perspectives that contemporary
humans cope with, the way in which the seemingly irrational bubbles up, reinforcing itself. His
songs focus on the unbuilt world and reckon with the realization that humans now navigates the
unbuilt world from our worldview that is informed by and enframed in the built world, a world
of technique.
The song lyrics are a poem. The first part of the poem begins with two lines that construct
a dichotomy between the built and unbuilt world and the subjects view of them both
simultaneously: “from up on the hill I can see the lights / of town through the trees” (TtT, Pt. 1).
To inhabit the modern human conditions and live amongst technique is to view the unbuilt,
which is specifically unbuilt nature (nature can be crafted, think of the forests in Europe for
example), through the frame of the built. The built, technology, sways through, Ge-stell,
enframes, how we view the unbuilt. Indeed, the notion of swaying that arises throughout
Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technique” is reflected in the line “and there is wind. / there
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Songs can be heard on the albums Clear Moon and Wind’s Poem on
<https://pwelverumandsun.bandcamp.com/>. Further citation is in bibliography.
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is only wind” (TtT, Pt. 1). The subject struggles not only to cope with the circumstance of
modern life, but to isolate some piece of causality, some piece that makes the irrational sensible.
The poem continues: “do I disdain them? that "land of dreams" / from up here you can see them
living / on the way home, through the trees / I have climbed the hill at twilight / to find the
source of wind / from up on the hill / I can see the lights of town / that land of dreams / through
the trees” (TtT, Pt. 1). The subject is not only in a reckoning with the implications of seeing the
unbuilt world through the light of the town, but is so taken by the allure of the unbuilt that the
subject seeks out the source of the wind, an entirely fruitless engagement, one so without end it
represents the kind of alienation that Heidegger describes man has with the rise of modern
technique. While the trees are causally revealed by the trees, the causality of the unbuilt is
fleeting, concealed. To seek out the source of wind is to stumble through the darkness of the
unbuilt, and yet one seeks the source because in the era of modern technique all sensation
demands explanation, the unbuilt itself becauses subject to the four causes and involves a
rational engagement with that which is beyond reason. How do we find the source of the wind?
In a given moment, how might we answer that query? While the wind is strongest on the hill, the
hill itself surely isn’t its source, and yet from that vantage the built is unconcealed anew again.
The subject is engaged in a yearning for description of that which avoids description, of that
which sways through, of that which is concealed to us because of modern technique. The subject,
entrenched in a worldview curated by modern technique, is engaged in an absurd pursuit.
While it’s unclear if Phil Elverum is deliberately in conversation with Heidegger, the
poem serves as a potent way of communicating profoundly subtle remarks. Poetry’s affective
capacity not only helps move our argument forward, but it reinforces, through its employment,
the argument made in Chapter 1. Part two of “Through the Trees” grapples more explicitly with
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the absurdity of modern technique. With the drive to describe that which evades description the
subject of the poem encounters, in entirely explicit terms, the dichotomy of the built and unbuilt:

I go on describing this place
and the way it feels to live and die.
The “natural world”
and whatever else it’s called
I drive in and out of town
seeing no edge, breathing sky
and it’s hard to describe
without seeming absurd.
I know there’s no other world:
Mountains and websites. (TtT, Pt. 2)

Grappling with the absurdity of life with post-modern technique and Ge-stell is captured in the
final lines. The entire section illuminates the idea I have been thrashing at, the idea that in the era
of modern technique, the way in which we come to know the world, the way in which we
describe it, is enframed by the techniques we employ and are affected by. While it is tempting to
begin to indulge in an attempt to trace the causal chains at work in this paradigm, one would be,
as the poem reveals, damned to being absurd in their attempt to describe.
Yet, as I described in Chapter 1, this realm, the realm of being which goes beyond reason,
is the realm of persuasion. To describe this circumstance, to convey it to another in hopes that
they begin to see it my way, would be to rely on persuasion. To reiterate, poetry reaches into the
realm that works with concepts beyond reason. Poetics and persuasion are intertwined, but
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clearly distinct, a distinction that has been sketched out throughout this project in many
moments. In this sense, persuasion and poetry are intertwined. Though, as I will argue in Chapter
3, persuasion is in a state of dramatic decline in the world of post-modern technique. In the world
of modern technique, in a world of the enframing of modern technique, we are engulfed in the
rational and yet it falls out of sight. Technique, despite its reliance of the laws of nature, conceals
its cause. In developing a sense of self, a worldview, in the world of modern technique, we are
simultaneously engaged in the objectification of the self, a self guided by objective causes,
whether algorithms and laws of nature, and yet that objectivity obscures, it conceals and entails a
sense of absurdity in the attempt to describe the state. Indeed, in the world of modern technique,
in our attempt to describe our circumstance, we are, as Elverum describes it, “clawing for
meaning” (TtT, Pt. 2).17 Yet that meaning is made in a world in which one may very well be
inhabiting the absurd, which Elverum gets at with the final lines of the poem: “A pile of trash /
the fog on the hill / standing in a parking lot squinting” (TtT, Pt. 2). The final lines sum up the
crux of my belaboured point, that in this absurd circumstance, living in the unbuilt natural world
enframed by the built world of technology, our worldview is curated, the way we see all is
profoundly impacted by this circumstance the nature of that enframing is profoundly important
in the quest for description of self and circumstance. Indeed, no matter where we stand, on the
hill looking through the trees, or in a parking lot next to a pile of trash, our very view of the
world, both metaphorically and literally, is influenced, and our clawing for meaning is aptly
described as a kind of squinting.
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Worth noting that Emerson describes an immensely similar search for meaning in his essay
“Fate.” This is beyond the scope of this project, but worth investigating if this point strikes you.
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Chapter 3

The Curated Algorithm in Theory & Practice

I am arguing that persuasion — in the era of post-modern technique — is dramatically
diminishing (insofar as being persuasive is an artform that is rarely employed) and the two
arguments posed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 — of persuasion and technique — add up to the
claim that there is a new mode of alienation from the body and hence that which belongs to
poiesis, that which involves pathos, insofar as a worldview is less tethered to the body and
subject to profound degrees of curation. The curated algorithm gives me grounds to make that
claim stronger.
An algorithm is a process or set of calculations intended to solve a problem. Algorithms
are used for computers and help not only organize data for the sake of presentation, but are also
used for computer programming. The reason that algorithms have the capacity to curate a
worldview is because they can be used to organize data about an individual, based on their
computer usage, and present them with information that is relevant to their interests based on
their data footprint. Algorithms are immensely practical and entirely prolific in the 21st century,
but have the capacity to be used for insidious purposes. Regardless of their use, they have a
profound impact on how we come to be presented with information (whether factually consistent
or not) about the world and henceforth profoundly impact ordinary communication and language
itself.
Algorithms are entirely prolific, yet are mostly hidden in contemporary life. Economic
markets, social media, databases, and various facets of our digitally enabled lives are guided by
algorithms. Algorithms are nothing new and have long been important in solving mathematical
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and technological problems The data that an algorithm uses regarding a particular individual has
come to determine what information is presented to the individual through their technology —
this is the crux of a curated algorithm. Many online services use curated algorithms to improve
the experience for consumers using the technology. Stated again, but differently, a curated
algorithm is a process through which a user's experience is made more efficient. Its purpose is to
tailor to the user by using previously collected data points about them in order to improve their
current experience on an online platform. For example, there is a music group named Porches.
“Porches” as a search term also refers to a part of the structure of a home. On my personalized
web browser, I often visit Porches’s website, that is Porches the music group. I listen to their
music on various devices, read news about them, I even have them as friends on social media
platforms, and so on. I have never once looked into owning or building a home. If I type
“Porches” into a search engine, their curated algorithm has enough data about me to prioritize
presenting me the music group's most recent news over porches on a house. The search results,
the links to different media presented to a user, would be dramatically different with the same
search term “porches” if another user had recently purchased a home. Indeed, if I began
searching for a home online, my results might begin to change when I type in the word
“porches.” While this is a benign example of how the internet, as a technological medium,
curates how one sees the world, it gives immediate insight into how a curated algorithm
functions, and how it can come to carve out what one engages with when they use this kind of
technology. Indeed, a curated algorithm has the capacity to frame how one sees the world,
insofar as it necessarily prioritizes certain information. This is an immense power to wield, and it
is indeed wielded as algorithms are designed by human beings, but human beings also set them
to their task and let the algorithm work as it will. Process can be prioritized over outcome.
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The purpose of a curated algorithm is to curate what is brought forth into one’s view of
the world. While the previous example was entirely practical and benign, there are insidious uses
of curated algorithms that have a profound impact on communication. For instance, Facebook,
uses a curated algorithm that gives preferences to posts that you are predisposed to like, based on
your previous internet data. Political news, for example, is organized such that only news that fits
your established political leanings will be shown to you, but news that may be dissonant,
unfamiliar will likely not be prioritized, such that you may never see it, one’s worldview may
never account for a side of a story you may be entirely inundated with.
Curated algorithms have mass effect. They necessarily impact billions of people on earth,
whether they have investments in markets, they use the internet at all, or actively engage in
social media. In light of the last two chapters, the implications that this kind of technology has on
communication are pertinent to consider. Heidegger’s arguments about technique were based on
the subtleties of Ge-stell in the era of modern technique, but no longer is Ge-stell a subtle
swaying, but it has come to be programmed into some forms of technology itself. Ge-stell, in this
context, doesn’t sway through technique, but is now part of the technique itself. Employing a
technique is the employment of a frame, and it can entirely subvert the role of the body and lead
to a kind of post-modern disembodiment, wherein persuasion becomes a useless affair insofar as
the body is not engageable in the ways that the likes of Aristotle and Wittgenstein describe.

Technology’s Implications for Worldviews and Persuasion

Heidegger’s analysis of technique leads to the basic claim that modern technique,
represented aptly by technology, enframes our worldview insofar as modern technologies force
us to see the world in particular ways, because it reveals only what is revealed and conceals a
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great deal more. So much of Heidegger’s analysis revolves around examples that involve some
kind of hands-on practice that it is hard to detach the body and its role from his theory. The
hands are tethered to the technique. For Heidegger, how we come to know the world — the ideas
we come to believe in the world — has a great deal to do with how we physically engage the
world. Post-modern technique alters that, insofar as post-modern technique is defined as a way of
the hands — the body — being untethered from the technique.
I make a cup with my hands, I build a house, I change the landscape, I change the mode
of reaching ends and my worldview alters. I construct an algorithm and it builds without me, it
carries forward without the body, and my worldview still alters. With that said, in Heidegger’s
terms, persuasion still has an active and fruitful role in communication. In the world of modern
technique, persuasion has no significantly diminished role that I can name, the body is still
tethered to technique. In the world of post-modern technique, however, persuasion is diminishing
in its activity and effect. Also, consider, beyond the causal claim I made in the previous sentence,
the affective impact.
To be clear, persuasion, which involves ideas beyond reason, is still employable today. It
is not as if persuasion has somehow disappeared from our language in totality. However, when
we try to persuade by reaching beyond the frame of post-modern technique, we often run into
issues insofar as seeing beyond that frame is made difficult for one’s worldview to account for.
Reaching beyond the frame of post-modern technique is best understood as an attempt to unsee
the world that we are constantly inundated with, an attempt to contradict what constitutes a
cohesive system of beliefs that are constantly instilled by technologies that one cannot even see.
Consider the man who steadfastly believes that the world has only been in existence for fifty
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years What we are seeing today, with what are in this context post-modern technologies, is the
hands, the body, becoming untethered from technique.
To engage post-modern techniques is not at all to involve the hands — the curated
algorithm is the clearest and most prolific example. Persuasion diminishes not because the frame
shrinks, but because what is presented in the frame is now curated by that which lies under it. A
curated algorithm orders the enframing without any hands-on engagement being involved. To
persuade in the paradigm would be to not just present claims that counter one’s pre-existing
beliefs, but to make claims that counter one's view of the world, a much more difficult task
indeed. In the era of post-modern technique we become disembodied, our beliefs can be ordered
without our knowing, and curated such that a seamless worldview is presented, again and again,
on so many platforms that anything counter to it would seem an absurdity. To persuade someone
in this context becomes all the more difficult if persuasion relies on so much that has to do with
pathos, with that which involves the body. Our worldviews, then, for those of us engaged with
these technologies, comes to be constituted differently. One might argue that this constitution is
more narrow. This involves a kind of value judgement that seems hard to reinforce, as narrow is
a pejorative, but the argument by no means seems to be unfounded.

Persuasion & Disembodiment

There is a sense in which there is a worldview that is of my own making and a worldview
that I take on, but am not the creator of. It is the latter sense that represents curation. It is the
latter sense that is subject to be disembodied. The former sense, in my terms, necessarily
involves the body. The latter sense, in Heidegger’s terms, does involve the body, but the nuance I
mean to contribute is that this embodiment is not necessarily mutually inclusive.
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The question must then become this: how can we persuade a worldview that is
disembodied?
To be clear, when I speak of disembodiment, I do not mean to say that the body is
entirely removed. The body has a shifting role. Disembodiment is a kind of detachment from a
person’s role in the construction of their own worldview, and this disembodiment is a of a
physical kind. Curation is not mere manipulation, as it is with Ge-stell, but a hidden way of
ordering, of making things stand, Bestand. This kind of ordering is detached from pathos insofar
as it is not formed by persuasive speech acts that involve the body, but instead rely on presenting
an image of the world that presents itself as entirely objective, as totally cohesive, even if this is
far from the case. Total truth in the mode I described is a tactic of totalitarian regimes in their
propaganda, but post-modern techniques conceals so much of what might be visible, and not
only does it conceal, it tailors a worldview to an individual. Curated worldviews involve the
employment of big data, of massive numbers of people's data footprints used and analyzed to
construct a worldview that is not only accounting for one’s idiosyncrasies, but constructs a
common vocabulary amongst a variety of users who can be viewed as similar. Curated
algorithms are in the business of constructing vocabularies to unify particular groups of people
and to reinforce those views, such that one would have to actively seek out opinions that are
different, rather than encounter them as they come according to a unadulterated set of opinions
might.
To be sure, humans have always been able to group off, to choose their own kinds of
people, and construct vocabularies with people similar to themselves. But these spaces are meant
to constitute the merely social, or the private, not the public sphere; however, our public sphere
has come to be curated and polarized in this way by post-modern technique. To tailor
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information to one’s idiosyncrasies, to subvert the body, and to curate a worldview that instills
what has been framed out and orders it cohesively is the impact of post-modern technique and
that has profound implications for communication and how we impart belief in everyday life. My
purpose has been to argue that there are indeed implications and to make suggestions about what
those implications are. I leave it to the reader and to myself to, in new works, explore the
implications further and wonder whether the changing modes of communication that are taking
place require turning our technologies in new directions.

Beyond the Trees: Concluding on the Absurd

In my view, poetry has been the most effective means of getting at the crux of many ideas
posed herein. The ideas that demand poetry tend to be those that have implications on that which
is beyond reason. The argument I have posed in this paper might leave one wondering about
authenticity or the possibility of subverting the circumstance of post-modern technique. I do not
pretend to have solutions to these issues, but have only just begun the process of identifying
these new problems for philosophy, and philosophers, in hopes of contributing to a nuanced
understanding of communication in our world. The philosophy of language, like all genres of
thought, relies on new ideas being born out of a particular ordering of past ideas that make a
discipline pregnant with a new thought. That this ordering can be done by an algorithm, one
designed by humans that then operates independently of us must be considered seriously for its
implications on communication itself, which has both philosophical, political, and ontological
implications that requires ethical investigations into the technologies that mobilize these
massively impactful techniques. Just as a teacher curates the readings for a class, new
technologies, new techniques can curate a view of the world that has a profound impact on the
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public. The absurd, the irrational might be one viable mode of being to subvert the curation of
worldviews that are of the kind that are disembodied.
Wallace Stevens's “Of Mere Being” presents a working sense of what I mean by the
previous statement:

The palm at the end of the mind,
Beyond the last thought, rises
In the bronze distance,

A gold-feathered bird
Sings in the palm, without human meaning,
Without human feeling, a foreign song.

You know then that it is not the reason
That makes us happy or unhappy.
The bird sings. Its feathers shine.

The palm stands on the edge of space.
The wind moves slowly in the branches.
The bird’s fire-fangled feathers dangle down. (PWS, 169).

There are a few distinct threads to distill from this poem that inform the ideas in posed herein.
Stevens employs a pun. Palm, on one hand, is a kind of tree. Palm, in Greek, is the name for a
phoenix, a gold-feathered fire-fangled bird. It is in this sense that the bird, which “sings in the
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palm,” is also the palm. Eleanor Cook writes about this play on words saliently: “the bird ‘sings
in the palm’ and through a pun is the palm. So also the poem is contained in its words or its
leaves, and vice versa; it also is its words or leaves. So also space is contained in the mind, and
vice versa; it also is the mind” (Cook). She goes on to say that “the ‘last thought’ is the last
thought possible before we move beyond reason, whether toward imagination or toward death”
(Cook). While her purpose is merely to examine the word-play that Stevens invents, it helps
reveal some of the philosophical underpinnings of this poem. To be amidst modern and postmodern technique forces the palm, in its dual sense, to be concealed. The disembodiment of postmodern technique involves — as a result of its constant objectification and drive to reinforce a
consistent worldview via curation — blurring the song “in the palm” that is “without human
meaning, without human feeling,” because there is no place for it to neatly fit.
If that which is beyond reason is blurred, if it is out of reach, than pathos falters, as
emotion becomes something to be rationalized. Stevens is clear in his saying that “it is not the
reason that makes us happy or unhappy,” which is to say that it is not reasons that makes us
happy or unhappy, but that which is beyond reason. That which extends beyond the frame of
reason, that which challenges Ge-stell, that which is “the palm” which “stands on the edge of
space.” In a moment that unifies the aforementioned Elverum poem and this Wallace Stevens
poem, Stevens describes the wind as moving “slowly in the branches.” The unbuilt world sways
through itself, unconcealing emotion, whether happiness or otherwise. We are persuaded by that
which blows the palm at the end of the mind, or we are shocked by it. We may be moved to
resist it or embrace it, but that move to resist or embrace is itself contingent on the body.
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